Strict Statutory Requirements for Arbitrator Removal: Dubai Court of Cassation Clarifies Article 16(1) of the Federal Arbitration Law
Dispute Resolution / UAE
Dr. Hassan ArabPartner, Regional Head of Dispute Resolution
Dina AssarKnowledge Lawyer,Dispute Resolution
Dubai Court of Cassation recently delivered a noteworthy ruling in Cassation No. 35 of 2025, providing much-needed clarity on the statutory requirements for the removal of arbitrators under UAE Federal Arbitration Law No.6 of 2018. The case rendered on the 25 March 2025, resulted from a conflict over the appointment and status of an arbitrator, procedural mistakes by the Dubai International Arbitration Center (DIAC), and the later appeal to the arbitrator's dismissal. Reiterating the high barrier to judicial involvement in arbitral processes and the safeguarding of arbitrator independence and impartiality, the Court's judgment offers significant direction on the interpretation and application of Article 16(1) of the Federal Arbitration Law.
The Appellant's application to remove the arbitrator was predicated on an agreement executed between the Appellant and the First Respondent, wherein the parties consented to refer all disputes arising from the implementation of said agreement to a three-member arbitral tribunal, with each party appointing one arbitrator and the two appointed arbitrators selecting the third to serve as chairperson.
Following an earlier judgment by the Dubai Court of Cassation, the DIAC was instructed to appoint an arbitrator on behalf of the First Respondent. However, an administrative error led to the Second Respondent being designated as a sole arbitrator, contrary to the parties’ agreement and the Court’s directive. Upon being notified of this error, the DIAC promptly clarified that the Second Respondent’s correct status was as a co-arbitrator, not a sole arbitrator.
Despite this correction, the Appellant raised concerns regarding the Second Respondent’s impartiality and the procedural handling of the appointment. The Appellant alleged that the Second Respondent’s initial conduct—specifically, his demand for fees as a sole arbitrator and his purported delay in engaging with the other appointed arbitrator—demonstrated a lack of impartiality and a disregard for the Court’s judgment.
Consequently, the Appellant petitioned the courts for the removal of the Second Respondent, the appointment of a new arbitrator, and the designation of a chairperson for the tribunal. The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, prompting the Appellant to escalate the matter to the Court of Cassation.
The Court of Cassation’s judgment provides a meticulous analysis of Article 16(1) of Federal Arbitration Law No. 6 of 2018, which sets out the statutory framework for the termination of an arbitrator’s appointment.
The Court of Cassation’s judgment provides a precise analysis of Article 16(1) of Federal Arbitration Law No. 6 of 2018, which sets out the statutory framework for the termination of an arbitrator’s appointment. The Court highlighted that the removal of an arbitrator is an exceptional measure, only to be exercised under strictly defined and cumulative conditions. The key elements of Article 16(1), as interpreted by the Court, are as follows:
Existence of Justifying Grounds: The Court underscored that removal is only warranted where there are substantive grounds, such as the arbitrator’s inability to perform their duties (due to health, social, or legal impediments), failure to commence or continue their functions, deliberate neglect of the arbitration agreement, or manifest disregard for responsibilities. The Court stressed that mere dissatisfaction with the arbitrator’s conduct or speculative concerns about impartiality does not suffice; there must be clear, objective evidence of incapacity, neglect, or bias.
Resulting Unjustified Delay: The grounds for removal must have a tangible impact on the arbitration proceedings, specifically causing an unjustified delay that prejudices the parties’ interests. The Court noted that the assessment of delay must be objective and based on the actual conduct of the arbitrator, not on hypothetical or anticipated scenarios.
Refusal to Withdraw: The arbitrator must have been allowed to voluntarily withdraw in light of the alleged grounds for removal. If the arbitrator refuses to step down, this condition is satisfied. The Court highlighted the importance of affording the arbitrator a fair opportunity to respond to the allegations and to present their defence.
No Agreement on Removal: The parties must not have reached a mutual agreement to remove the arbitrator. The Court recognized that party autonomy is paramount in arbitration, and consensual removal is always preferable to judicial intervention.
Formal Petition to the Competent Authority: A party seeking removal must submit a formal petition to the competent authority, which may be the arbitral institution or the court, depending on the circumstances. The Court clarified that only a decision by the competent authority terminating the arbitrator’s appointment is final and not subject to appeal. However, decisions rejecting removal applications remain appealable through the ordinary judicial process.
Applying the above principles to the facts of the case, the Court of Cassation found that none of the statutory conditions for removal were met. The evidence demonstrated that the initial error in the appointment of the Second Respondent as a sole arbitrator was a genuine administrative mistake by the DIAC, which was promptly rectified upon discovery. The DIAC’s subsequent communications made it clear to all parties, including the Second Respondent, that he was to serve as a co-arbitrator, not as a sole arbitrator.
Importantly, the Court found that the Second Respondent, once apprised of the correct status, engaged constructively with the Appellant’s nominated arbitrator to proceed with the appointment of a chairperson for the tribunal. There was no evidence of recalcitrance, refusal to perform duties, or unjustified delay attributable to the Second Respondent. The Court also rejected the Appellant’s allegations of bias and lack of impartiality, noting that the mere fact of an initial misunderstanding or a demand for fees (which was based on the erroneous appointment) did not amount to evidence of partiality or misconduct.
The Court reaffirmed the fundamental distinction between independence and impartiality:
Independence requires the absence of any relationship—be it financial, social, or professional—that could influence the arbitrator’s decision-making.
Impartiality requires the absence of bias or any circumstance that could give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s neutrality.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the Appellant’s objections were, in essence, a re-argument of factual matters already considered and rejected by the lower courts. There was no legal or evidentiary basis for the removal of the Second Respondent. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal’s decision was upheld, the appeal was dismissed, and the Appellant was ordered to pay costs and attorneys’ fees.
The Dubai Court of Cassation’s judgment in Cassation No. 35 of 2025 serves as a definitive statement on the high threshold for the removal of arbitrators under UAE law. The decision underscores the judiciary’s respect for the autonomy and integrity of arbitral proceedings, limiting judicial intervention to only the most compelling and substantiated cases. Parties to arbitration in the UAE should be acutely aware that the removal of an arbitrator is not a remedy available for tactical or speculative reasons; it requires clear, objective evidence of incapacity, neglect, or bias, and must be pursued in strict accordance with the procedural safeguards set out in Article 16(1) of the Federal Arbitration Law.
This judgment reinforces the UAE’s position as a pro-arbitration jurisdiction, committed to upholding the independence and impartiality of arbitrators and ensuring that arbitration remains an effective, fair, and autonomous method of dispute resolution.
For further information,please contact Dr. Hassan Arab.
Published in June 2025
